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LETTERS
Contagion on 
the Internet
To the Editor: Computer viruses
are designed to be pests, proliferating
in uncontrolled ways and causing
severe damage to electronic data.
These malignant programs, which
amplify between files and computers,
are strikingly similar in virulence,
modes of spread, and evolutionary
pathways over time to the microbes
that cause infectious diseases. Both
biological viruses and these virtual
viruses are transmitted from host to
host. Computer viruses are a human
invention; however, their development
follows a well-recognized biological
route. Relatively harmless ancestors
gradually or step-by-step evolve into
“pathogens;” the host develops adap-
tive defense mechanisms, which in
turn select for new virus “variants;”
eventually, equilibrium is reached
between infection and host defenses.
Comparing “virtual microbes” with
their biological counterparts can help
us control both. 
The term “computer virus” is
loosely used to describe computer
“malware,” an umbrella term that
includes the following categories. 1)
Viruses. A computer virus is a pro-
gram that implants a version of itself
in any program it can modify. The
modified program, once run, attempts
to modify other programs directly
associated with it. Computer viruses
spread by sharing data on infected
disks or diskettes. Unlike their biolog-
ical counterparts (which are fast and
very infectious), computer viruses
spread slowly and infrequently
between computers. 2) Worms. A
worm is a self-contained program that
replicates itself and sends copies to
any connected computer, with little or
no user interaction. Unlike biological
worms (which spread slowly), com-
puter worms spread rapidly and with-
out much user interaction between
computers of a network, including the
Internet. (In view of the contagious-
ness of biological worms and viruses,
the terms should have been reversed.)
3) Trojan horses. A Trojan horse is a
program concealing harmful code that
usually makes a computer or network
available to unauthorized users in an
appealing or unsuspicious package. A
virus, worm, or Trojan horse can be
latent (then also called a logic bomb)
and become active only after a certain
period. 
Each class of computer malware
has hundreds of variants, and many
variants have several slightly modified
versions, paralleling microbial diver-
sity. Worms, such as the infamous
“ILOVEYOU” worm in 2000, may
employ a universal message of gratifi-
cation to entice users. Their wide dis-
semination parallels the spread of
socially transmitted diseases (e.g.,
influenza) that have the potential to
infect everyone susceptible. In con-
trast, computer viruses (spread by
sharing data on infected diskettes) par-
allel sexually transmitted diseases,
whose spread is related to specific
behavioral practices. Viruses or
worms that are spread undetected but
are activated at a later date (as was the
case with the Michelangelo virus, dis-
covered in 1991 and still around)
resemble latent microbes, such as HIV.
Denial-of-service attacks, which block
access to a server by an onslaught of
messages, are the equivalent of toxins,
since neither can reproduce in their
host and are only harmful above a crit-
ical concentration. Spam (unwanted
but harmless e-mail), the curse of
computer users with slow modems
through expensive telephone connec-
tions, resembles bacterial commen-
sals that can injure the host only under
specific conditions.
Biological viruses can mutate rap-
idly, create novel pathogenic and
transmission routes, and develop anti-
genic variation to evade host immu-
nity. In the computer world, worms
exhibit similar behavior. Once a worm
has been transmitted successfully,
variants quickly emerge. These vari-
ants cause damage in similar ways but
evade detection and impediments
installed to provide “immunity” to the
original “strain.” Therefore, knowl-
edge of biological infections can be
used to predict and anticipate highly
virulent computer infections.
Although the computer user has
some recourse against computer
viruses, the costs may be high. As
with biological viruses, good hygienic
practice is helpful. Just as they should
wash hands frequently, avoid exposure
to people with colds, or use condoms
to protect against infectious diseases,
computer users should mistrust (and
thus not open) files received through
unexpected channels or with unknown
extensions or subject lines, request
confirmation from the sender before
opening attachments, and regularly
back up hard disks to reduce the risk
of losing data. The consequences of
such actions in terms of time, disk
space, and efficiency illustrate a bio-
logical truth: immunity has cost.
Effective antiviral barriers are impedi-
ments to communication. Moreover,
virus protection programs are only as
good as the last virus recognized, pro-
viding only partial protection at best.
Computer users have not always taken
inconvenient precautions, even in
view of serious consequences.
ILOVEYOU was a worm that used the
same mechanism of spread as Melissa,
which had been released a year earlier.
Yet, ILOVEYOU turned out to be
even more destructive than Melissa.
Biological immune disorders in
which host defenses turn against the
host and actually cause damage are
known as autoimmune diseases. Com-
puter autoimmune disorders parallel
their biological counterparts.
Recently, a warning (defense mecha-
nism used by computer users) turned
out to be a not-so-harmless hoax. The
hoax warning stated that certain files
were infected by a computer virus.
Heeding the warning, unsuspecting
computer users removed the affected
utility files from their computers’
operating systems. The harm mediated
by this “host defense” was relatively
small in this particular case, resem-
bling the discomfort of allergies, in
which immune responses to benignLETTERS
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agents cause limited damage. How-
ever, more malignant forms of “auto-
mutilating” hoaxes are likely to
emerge that could be as devastating to
computers as some autoimmune dis-
eases are to humans.
The electronic monoculture that
improves communication also
increases the risk for contagion. Pre-
dominant use of a single operating
system has improved communication
and sharing of electronic data but has
also facilitated ready amplification of
virulent programs. As with biological
infection, transmission of computer
infection depends on susceptibility of
the population. Virus producers saw
an opportunity in the popular prefer-
ence worldwide for PCs with
Microsoft Windows operating sys-
tems. The enormous popularity of
these systems, along with their long-
recognized inadequate protection
against misuse, made computer users
susceptible. Virtual viruses able to
infect multiple operating systems are
rare (as are biological viruses with
broad host specificity), and even when
infected, computers that run on differ-
ent operating systems (e.g., Mac,
Unix) or other-than-Outlook e-mail
programs usually are dead-end hosts
for PC viruses.
Pathogens do not reinvent the
wheel. Virulence genes are constantly
“stolen” and reused. Thus, new com-
binations of virulence genes can result
in new pathogenic strategies, and such
combinations frequently accumulate
in pathogenicity islands. Reuse and
combination of effective (and infec-
tive) strategies are also common in
computer malware. A recent example
demonstrates the value of just the right
amount of virulence. A highly danger-
ous worm called Nimda (Admin in
reverse) was released exactly 1 week
after the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attack in the United States. Nimda
combined the most powerful strategies
of Code Red and SirCam and spread
more rapidly than any previous worm.
Clicking on the subject line of an
infected e-mail (to delete it, for
instance) itself activated the worm.
However, because of the immensity of
the threat, the Internet community
responded extremely rapidly. Within
hours after its release, alerts to system
administrators on how to block the
worm had effectively slowed its
spread. Early surveillance and barrier
development averted disaster. As in
contained epidemics of hemorrhagic
fevers, the immense threat of high
contagion and lethality prompts effec-
tive measures to rapidly recognize
outbreaks and prevent pandemics. 
The types of measures to be used
against computer contagion can be
learned from biology. Immune effec-
tors of plants and animals protect
against a broad range of pathogens;
however, in nature this system
evolved over millions of years. Engi-
neering protective computer systems
with similar efficacy within a few
years is a great challenge. Current pro-
tection programs mainly resemble
innate immunity, but programs that
learn from exposure (thus resembling
adaptive immunity) are under devel-
opment. Vaccination with relatively
harmless microbes primes the immune
system. Biological hosts also naturally
carry protective microflora that com-
pete with pathogens. Could we pro-
duce “virtual vaccines” that are
beneficial to the computers carrying
them (e.g., by blocking preferred sites
of entrance for viruses or repairing
viral damage automatically) and let
these “good” microbes circulate on the
Internet just as malignant viruses do?
Crude versions of such vaccines have
already been developed. Recently, a
worm by the name Fixing the Holes
was discovered that utilized known
security holes to spread to other hosts.
Using “good” microbes would have its
costs: occupation of Internet capacity
and consequent slowdown of data
transmission and presence of mali-
cious worms disguised as beneficial
ones to elude detection. 
Knowledge of infectious diseases
may help control computer contagion.
Conversely, study of computer mal-
ware may help curb infectious disease
emergence. Internet contagion illus-
trates how pathogens emerge and
spread in our increasingly small
world. The speed of virtual pathogen
evolution makes it possible to follow
the process of mutation and selection
in real-time. With countless inter-
linked computers, the risk for virtual
contagion is so great that urgent steps
are needed to avoid catastrophe. How
many pandemics will it take before we
accept the risks and costs of computer
immunity? Similarly, to protect
against emerging pathogens, we must
use all tools available, including vir-
tual pandemics. A task force to collect
data on the epidemiology of virtual
infections as a model for infectious dis-
eases might be an important first step.
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Emergence and 
Rapid Spread of 
Tetracycline-
Resistant Vibrio 
cholerae Strains, 
Madagascar
To the Editor: The Indian Ocean
was free of cholera for decades, until
January 1998, when an outbreak was
detected in Comoros Islands (1). On
March 23, 1999, the Malagasy Epide-
miological Surveillance System
reported the first case of cholera in
Mahajanga, a harbor on the northwest
coast (2). In May 1999, the Malagasy
sanitary authorities set up sanitary bar-
ricades at the borders of the two prov-
inces—Mahajanga and Antananarivo
—affected by the epidemic. Oral dox-
ycycline was systematically given to